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CASES NOTED
confused the conflict-of-laws rules applicable to foreign decrees under the
full faith and credit clause with the law to be applied where foreign decrees
for separate maintenance are established as local decrees. In so doing, it is
submitted that the Nevada court made an unnecessary extension of the doctrine laid down in the Estin case. " '
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PENALTY PROVISIONS UNDER THE
FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING ACT
The National Association of Manufacturers sought to enjoin prosecutions against them by the Government for violations of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, contending that the penalty provision' infringed
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition. Held, the penalty
contravenes the First Amendment of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom
of speech and petition. National Asociation of Manufacturers of the United
States v. McGrath, 103 F. Supp. 510 (D.D.C. 1952).
The Congress seldom deprives a convicted person of either his Civil
or Constitutional rights as the penalty for violation of a statute, preferring to
rely on the formula of fine or imprisonment.2 However, the last twenty
years have evidenced the increased use of punishment designed to regulate
a particular economic or political situation without resort to imprisonment.,3
Because of the singular nature of the problem involved, the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act depends for its effectiveness on the prohibition from
influencing legislation for three years, those lobbyists convicted for noncompliance. 4 This sanction is a type which deprives a convicted person of a
Constitutional right as the penalty for his crime. The most frequently
expressed grounds for holding a penal provision, unconstitutional as to a
litigant challenging the validity of the legislation, is that the penalty prevents
16. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
1. 60 STAT. 839, 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-270 (1946). (The penalty clause provides for a
fine and imprisonment. In addition, it provides that any person so convicted shall be
prohibited from appearing in a Congressional committee and from attempting to influence
diicctly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any proposed legislation for a period of
three years. 310 [b]).
2. Statutes covering similar problems: Corrupt Practices Act, 43 S'rAr. 1070 (1925),
2 U.S.C. § 241 (1927) and 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1950) (registration provisions identical to
Lobbying Act, but sanction is fine and imprisonment); The Voorhis Act, 54 STAT. 1201
(1940), 46 U.S.C. 643(b) (1944) (fine and imprisonment); Foreign Agents Registration
Act, 52 STAT. 631 (1938), as amended, 56 STAT. 248 (1942), 22 U.S.C. § 618 (1952)
(fine and imprisonment).
3. 54 STAT. 1141 (1940); 8 U.S.C. § 706 (1942) (deserting naturalized citizen);
Nelson v. Secretary of Agriculture, 133 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1943) (suspension); Wright
v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 112 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1940) (expulsion); Farmers' Livestock Comm. Co. v. United States, 54 F.2d 375 (E.D. Ill. 1931) (suspension).
4. 47 COL. L. REv. 98, 109 (1947), n. 66. For the actual effectiveness of this
sanction in the Federal and State Lobbying Act see 27 NEB. L. Rrv. 123 (1947).
5. The right of petition is ", . . a simple, primitive, and natural right. As a privilege
it is not even denied in addressing the Deity." I CooLIEY's CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIXTATiO N

738 (5th ed.).
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resort to the courts,0 or that the penalty provided is so excessive as to be unreasonable, thus constituting a denial of due process of law," or it falls within

the prohibition of the Eighth Amendment against excessive fines and cruel
and unusual punishments.8
The court's decision inthe instant case reveals no application of the
traditional tests generally applied to penalties, but bases its denial on the very
nature and type of the penalty, stressing that a Constitutional right is being
suspended.9 The court reasoned that a person convicted of a crime "may
not for that reason be stripped of his constitutional privileges,"' 0 obviously
relying on the fact that the First Amendment provides that the Congress
However, the penalty
shall make no law abridging the various freedoms.'
of imprisonment has been accepted as the traditional method of dealing
with public offenders even though it necessitates an obvious regulation of
certain Constitutional rights.' 2 Implied in the sanction of imprisonment is
the strictest regulation, and at times denial of the freedoms of speech,
assembly, press, petition and even religion, if necessary to the orderly function
of prison routine.'- But the imprisonment is regulated and the individual
4
adequately protected by the protection afforded by the Eighth Amendment
and the due process clause." It follows that if the Congress impliedly regulates the freedoms of the First Amendment by the sanction of imprisonment,
it should be able to impose, as a sanction to the same extent, the regulation
6. Originating as dictum in Catting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 99102 (1901 ) and receiving elaborate treatment in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
7. St. Louis, [roll Mountain and Southern Ry. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63 (1919);
Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340 (1913); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas,
212 U.S. 86 (1909).
8. Stroud v, Johnston, 139 F.2d 171, cert. denied 321 U.S. 796 (1944).
9. There has been little question of the ability of the legislature to provide penalties
denying Civil Rights as distinguished from Constitutional Rights. Beginning with the
early concept of "Civiliter Mortus" (the extinction of all civil rights), Avery v. Everett, 110
N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148 (N.Y. App. 1888) (American courts have rejected any interpretation of the common law which treats a convict as being civally dead). Platner v. Sherwoods, 6 Johns. Ch. 118 (N.Y. 1822). In some jurisdictions, while admitting that the
theory of civil death has been repudiated generally in the United States they have felt
compelled to apply it because of existing statutes. Quick v. Western Ry. of Ala., 207
Ala. 376, 92 So. 608 (1922). Thus in New York a life convict is not entitled to probate
of a will. In re Lindewall's Will, 287 N.Y. 347, 39 N.E.2d 907 (1942) (based on
Penal Law of New York § 511(2). Also that a convict is no longer married under N.Y.
Dlom. REL. LAW 86, Imprisonment for Life, Art. 2, 1941 (61). In states which have
abolished civil death there are still some vestiges of this doctrine. Typical of the civil
disabilities still remaining are: inability to vote or hold public office, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT.
c.38, § 587 (1935). l)isqualification to serve as a juror. See, e.g., Dodys v. State, 73
Ga. App. 483, 486, 37 S.E.2d 173, 175 (1946); State v. Richey, 196 So. 545, 546
(La. 1940).
10. N.A.M. v. McGrath, 103 F. Supp. 510, 514 (D.D.C. 1952).
11. U.S. Cors'r. AMEND. I.
12. I COoLEY'S CoNsTrroUTIoNAL LiUCITATiONs 710, (8th ed. 1927).
13. In modern codes of criminal internment there runs the theme of reasonable restraint. CRAOPALO, CRIMINOLOGY Part IV, Suggested Basis for an International Penal
Code, 405-414 (1914).
14. McCleary v. Hudspeth, 124 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1941) cert. denied 316 U.S. 670
(1942) (cruel and unusual). Rose v. United States, 128 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 651 (1942) (excessiveness).
15. Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411 (1942).
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of a particularfreedom of that Amendment, subject to the same constitutional requirements.
It is submitted, that the reference in the instant case to the direct regulation of those freedoms in the First Amendment should not be construed
to deny the State the power to punish the wrongdoer by the most effective
method available, subject specifically to the standards of the Eighth Amendment and the due process clause. The practical result that would follow such

a holding would be to compel the Congress to deal with the lobbyist by
increasing the term of imprisonment from one to four years; thus restricting

the right of petition and the other freedoms of the First Amendment as well.
CONTRACTS-DATE FOR COMPUTING EXCHANGE ON
FOREIGN CURRENCY CONTRACT
The parties entered into a contract to be performed entirely in Mexico
with payment in Mexican currency. Defendant breached the contract and
plaintiff brought suit and recovered judgment in a United States District
Court. The judgment awarded damages in the currency of the United
States based upon the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of the breach.
On appeal held, the rate of exchange to be used in computing the damages
is that prevailing at the time of the judgment. Paris v. Central Chiclera, S.
De R.L., 193 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1952).
It is a well settled point of law that, in allowing recovery for the breach
of a contract to pay foreign money, the judgment can only direct payment
in the money of the forum.' The problem arises in the choice of a date
from which to compute the rate of exchange. Shall it be the date of breach
of the contract or the date of the judgment? This becomes an extremely
important point when there has been an appreciable fluctuation in the rate
of exchange between these dates. At first glance it appears that there is
hopeless confusion among the cases. A closer examination demonstrates
that this is not the case. There are two leading United States Supreme
Court decisions on this question-the Deutsche Bank case and the Hicks
case 3 -and in both cases the opinion of the Court was written by Mr. Justice
Holmes. The Deutsche Bank case holds the rate of exchange is to be computed as of the date of judgment while the Hicks case holds that it is the
date of breach which should be used. An examination of the facts in the
two cases shows us the reason for the apparent discrepancy between the two
decisions and gives us a clear understanding of the law as it applies to these
situations. In the Deutsche Bank case the action was for a debt in German
marks which was payable in Germany. In the Hicks case, the debt was in
1. Rives v. Dukes, 105 U.S. 132 (1881); Stewart v. Salarnon, 94 U.S. 434 (1877);
1iebeskind v. Mexican Light & Power Co., 116 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1941).
2. Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517 (1926).
3. Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71 (1925).

